外交：美元的未来(2020.06.04)
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提要：美元主导地位面临的主要风险并非来自北京，而是来自华盛顿自身。美国必须保持造就了美元主导地位的那些条件：植根于健全宏观经济政策的充满活力的经济体系；开放透明的政治体制；以及美国在全球经济、政治和安全事务中的领导地位。简言之，美国能否保持美元地位，并非决定于中国，而是几乎完全取决于美国自身能否适应疫情过后的现实、并继续充当全球的成功典范。
（外脑精华·北京）美元主导地位的持久性
3月底，新冠肺炎疫情引发全球金融市场崩盘。正如2008年间那样，国际投资者争相买入美元以避险，美联储只得向其他央行提供巨额美元。二战结束的75年后，美元的主导地位依然稳固。
美元主导地位的持久性非同寻常，尤其是鉴于新兴市场的崛起，以及美国经济的相对衰落－－其在全球GDP中的占比已由1960年的接近40%降至今天的仅仅25%。然而，美元的地位将面临多种因素的考验，包括美国政府应对新冠疫情的能力，及其将以怎样的经济政策来管控国债、并削减结构性财政赤字。
美元地位对美国至关重要。美元的主导性国际储备货币地位令美元资产的回报率低于其他币种资产，从而令美国受益匪浅。同样重要的是，美元的地位还令美国能够保持巨额贸易赤字、降低汇率风险、并使得美国金融市场更具流动性。最后，美元的地位还令美国银行凭借美元融资的便利性占据优势。
人民币的挑战
美元的主导地位如此持久，实属历史的特例，在中国崛起的情况下就更是如此。人民币最有潜力成为美元地位的挑战者。中国的经济规模、经济增长前景、与全球经济的深度融合以及人民币国际化态势都有助于提升人民币地位。尽管如此，中国还须克服一些重大障碍，才能让人民币真正成为一种主要全球储备货币。
美国应该清醒认识到美中竞争的真正关键所在。美国应保持在金融与技术创新领域的领导地位，但又无需夸大中国数字储备货币对美元的影响。最重要的是，美国必须保持造就了美元主导地位的那些条件：植根于健全宏观经济政策的充满活力的经济体系；开放透明的政治体制；以及在全球经济、政治和安全事务中的领导地位。简言之，美国能否保持美元地位，并非决定于中国，而是几乎完全取决于美国自身能否适应疫情过后的现实、并继续充当全球的成功典范。
美元价值决定于美国自身的抉择
当然，美国应将中国视为强大的经济竞争对手，认真对待。但就美元的主导地位而言，其主要风险并非来自北京，而是来自华盛顿自身。美国必须维护本国经济的全球信誉。否则，美元的主导地位将面临危机。
美元的地位是美国政治与经济体制的根本健康度的反映。为维护美元地位，美国经济必须是值得各国效仿的榜样。而这又要求美国政治体制能够采取有效政策，令更多美国人实现经济富足。这还要求美国政治体制能够保持本国的财政健康度。历史经验表明，财政上长期放纵无度的国家无法独占鳌头。美国政治体制必须应对当前的经济挑战。
美国的对外经济政策也很重要，因为这关系到美国的信誉、并会决定美国参与全球事务的能力。为保持全球领导地位，美国应引领根据新现实调整全球贸易、投资与科技竞争规则的行动。
美国政府还应明白，单边制裁（美元的主导地位是其先决条件）并非没有代价。以美元为武器会促使美国的盟友和敌人发展替代性储备货币，甚至可能为此联手。这正是欧盟努力推动欧元用于国际交易的原因所在。
对持有者而言，一国货币的价值归根结底取决于该国的经济与政治基本面。美国在新冠危机过后若干年间的表现将是重大考验。美国必须采取有效的宏观经济政策，令其国债和结构性财政赤字走上可持续之路；美国决不能浪费曾造就其经济力量的有利条件，这些条件都反映了创新与有效治理的理念。如果美国能做到，就有理由对美元满怀信心。
英文原文：
The Future of the Dollar
In late March, global financial markets were collapsing amid the chaos of the novel coronavirus pandemic. International investors immediately sought refuge in the U.S. dollar, just as they had done during the 2008 financial crisis, and the U.S. Federal Reserve had to make huge sums of dollars available to its global counterparts. Seventy-five years after the end of World War II, the primacy of the dollar has not waned.
The enduring dominance of the dollar is remarkable—especially given the rise of emerging markets and the relative decline of the U.S. economy, from nearly 40 percent of world GDP in 1960 to just 25 percent today. But the dollar’s status will be tested by Washington’s ability to weather the COVID-19 storm and emerge with economic policies that allow the country, over time, to manage its national debt and curb its structural fiscal deficit.
The stature of the dollar matters. The dollar’s role as the primary global reserve currency makes it possible for the United States to pay lower rates on dollar assets than it otherwise would. Equally significant, it enables the country to run larger trade deficits, reduces exchange-rate risk, and makes American financial markets more liquid. Finally, it favors U.S. banks because of their enhanced access to dollar funding.
That the dollar has maintained this stature for so long is a historic anomaly, particularly in the context of a rising China. The Chinese renminbi (RMB) has by far the greatest potential to assume a role rivaling that of the dollar. China’s economic size, prospects for future growth, integration into the global economy, and accelerated efforts to internationalize the RMB all favor an expanded role for the Chinese currency. But by themselves, these conditions are insufficient. And China’s much-touted successes in the realm of fintech—including its rapid deployment of mobile payment systems and the recent pilot project by the People’s Bank of China to test a digital RMB—will not change that. A central bank–backed digital currency does not alter the fundamental nature of the RMB.
Beijing still has major hurdles to overcome before the RMB can truly emerge as a primary global reserve currency. Among other transformative measures, it needs to make more progress in moving to a market-driven economy, improve corporate governance, and develop efficient, well-regulated financial markets that earn the respect of international investors so that Beijing can eliminate capital controls and turn the RMB into a market-determined currency.
Washington should be clear-eyed about what is actually at stake in the competition with China. The United States should maintain its lead in financial and tech innovation, but there is no need to exaggerate the impact of a Chinese digital reserve currency on the U.S. dollar. Above all, the United States must preserve the conditions that created the dollar’s primacy in the first place: a vibrant economy rooted in sound macroeconomic and fiscal policies; a transparent, open political system; and economic, political, and security leadership abroad. In short, sustaining the dollar’s status will not be determined by what happens in China. Rather, it will depend almost entirely on the United States’ ability to adapt its post-COVID-19 economy so that it remains a model of success.
To be sure, the United States needs to take China seriously as a formidable economic competitor. But when it comes to the primacy of the dollar, the main risk stems not from Beijing but from Washington itself. The United States must maintain an economy that inspires global credibility and confidence. Failure to do so will, over time, put the U.S. dollar’s position in peril.
The dollar’s status is a proxy for the fundamental soundness of the American political and economic system. To safeguard the dollar’s position, the U.S. economy must remain a model of success and for emulation. That, in turn, requires a political system capable of implementing policies that will allow more Americans to flourish and achieve economic prosperity. It also requires a political system capable of maintaining the country’s fiscal health. History knows of no country that remained on top without fiscal prudence over the long term. The U.S. political system must be responsive to today’s economic challenges.
The United States’ economic policy choices abroad also matter greatly because they affect U.S. credibility and, to a large extent, determine its ability to shape global outcomes. To sustain that leadership, the United States should champion an initiative to adjust and update the global rules and norms that govern trade, investment, and competition in technology to reflect twenty-first-century realities.
Washington should also be mindful that unilateral sanctions—made possible by the primacy of the dollar—are not free of cost. Weaponizing the dollar in this way can energize both U.S. allies and foes to develop alternative reserve currencies—and maybe even to join forces to do so. That is precisely why the European Union has been pushing to further promote the euro in international transactions.
The value of a national currency to its holders is ultimately a reflection of the country’s economic and political fundamentals. How the United States emerges in the years following the COVID-19 crisis will be an important test. First and foremost, the country must foster macroeconomic policies that put it on a sustainable path to manage the national debt and the trajectory of the structural fiscal deficit, and it must not squander the fundamentals that have sustained its economic might, all of which are rooted in a spirit of innovation and effective government. If Washington adheres to this course, there is every reason to have confidence in the dollar.
来源：《外交》，作者：亨利·保尔森
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