经济学人：法德的欧洲复苏计划展示惊人的抱负

经济学人：法德的欧洲复苏计划展示惊人的抱负(2020.06.02) .zhubiaoti {font-family: 黑体;font-size:18pt;line-height:23pt; text-align:center;FONT-weight:800;color:black} .fubiaoti {font-family: 黑体;font-size:14pt;line-height:20pt; text-align:center;FONT-weight:700;color:black} .zhongwen{font-size:12pt;line-height:180%} .yingwen{font-size:13pt;line-height:150%} .tiyao{font-family: 楷体_GB2312;font-size:14pt;line-height:150%} 　　提要：法德提出的疫后欧盟复苏计划的抱负令人大感意外。该计划的中心内容是设立一个总额5000亿欧元的欧洲复苏基金，资金来自共同借款，列入欧盟7年预算。这一次默克尔做出了很大让步。有评论认为，德国支持如此大规模的欧盟债务是重大原则性转变。默克尔的保守派盟友对法德新计划的批评颇为和缓。但该计划还面临其他挑战。 　　（外脑精华·北京）“一切开端都有某种魔力”，三年前，刚刚出任法国总统的埃马纽埃尔·马克龙访问柏林时，德国总理安格拉·默克尔曾引用过赫尔曼·黑塞这句诗。但她又补充说：“只有取得成果，魔力才会持续。”然而，三年来的成果却寥寥无几。欧元区重启计划落空。修订的法德条约缺少干货。从英国脱欧到巴尔干事务，默克尔和马克龙事事争吵。欧洲“火车头”几乎一事无成。 　　令人意外的抱负 　　因此，两位领袖提出的疫后欧盟复苏计划于5月18日公布后，其抱负令人大感意外。该计划的主要内容包括提升欧盟医疗能力，以及强化“经济主权”。但中心内容是设立一个总额5000亿欧元（约合5460亿美元）的欧洲复苏基金，相当于欧盟GDP的3.6%，资金来自共同借款，列入欧盟7年预算（即多年金融框架，缩写为MFF）。意大利和西班牙立刻表示支持。金融市场大涨，意大利借贷成本下跌。法国媒体常常反对马克龙，这一次却反应热烈。 　　默克尔做出重大让步 　　马克龙原本主张设立规模更大的基金，并在MFF之外运作。但他相比，默克尔做出的让步更大。在新冠疫情席卷全欧之时，默克尔一直反对德国全力参与救助受疫情打击最重的欧盟成员国。以法国为首的九国力主欧盟各国联合发行“新冠债券”，但默克尔的密友、德国经济部长彼得·阿尔特迈尔（Peter Altmaier）却称之为“幻影辩论”。 　　按法德的新计划，政府的责任限于按对MFF的缴款份额提供担保；德国的份额为27%，因而担保总额为1350亿欧元。然而，伦敦经济学院的欧盟观察家Iain Begg评论说，德国支持如此大规模的欧盟债务是重大原则性转变。默克尔的第二个让步是同意接受资金的国家不必偿还。因此可以想见，受危机影响较小的德国的付出将远超过所得。 　　法德新计划出台之前，马克龙和德国财长奥拉夫·朔尔茨（Olaf Scholz）都对默克尔施加了压力。默克尔为什么会改变立场？德国官员表示，默克尔的本意是扩大MFF，但后来她意识到，欧盟成员国政府财力不足，无力承担。据报道，默克尔说这是欧盟经历过的最严重危机，这表明她可以接受采取严厉措施。德国宪法法院最近做出的一项裁决对欧洲央行的债券购买计划提出了质疑，这也可能令默克尔关注过度依赖货币政策的风险。 　　依然面临挑战 　　默克尔的保守派盟友对法德新计划的批评颇为和缓。但该计划还面临其他挑战。第一项挑战是补充该计划的具体内容，包括拨款和偿还债务规则。这是欧盟委员会的工作；欧委会的MFF方案公布后，随之而来的将是欧盟27国政府的热烈讨论，欧盟预算须得到所有成员国政府的批准。目前已有一些政府表示不满。“节俭四国”奥地利、丹麦、荷兰和瑞典要求缩小基金规模、采取贷款的形式、并规定严格的条件。 　　这些效果必定会屈服于法德的联合压力，但或许会得到一些让步。MFF的拨款条件通常非常宽松。然而，法德计划要求动用复苏基金的成员国政府推行可靠的经济政策和有力的经济改革日程。 　　节俭四国最担心的是欧盟财政一体化的持久性深化。新基金的设计意图是暂时性的，仅用来缓解疫情对欧盟成员国的打击。然而，彼德森国际经济研究所的Jacob Funk Kirkegaard认为，确立了以共同债务应对共同挑战的原则，便会降低下一次类似情况的行动门槛。再则，偿还债务的需要也会推动设立欧盟统一收入的主张。默克尔关于欧盟改革的言辞也开始发生奇怪的变化；在总理任期的末尾，她开始重提修订欧盟条约、转向“政治联盟”的话题。这也许不是她最后一次制造意外。 　　英文原文： Not quite Hamiltonian 　　But a Franco-German plan to boost Europe is surprisingly ambitious. 　　“IN EVERY BEGINNING dwells a certain magic,” beamed Angela Merkel, cribbing from Herman Hesse, when a freshly inaugurated Emmanuel Macron visited Berlin three years ago. But Germany’s chancellor added an earthy caveat: “The magic lasts only when there are results.” And there have been precious few to speak of. A plan to reboot the euro area was ground down to a budget of homeopathic insignificance. A revised Franco-German treaty substituted symbols for substance. Mrs Merkel and Mr Macron fell out on everything from Brexit to the Balkans. Europe’s “locomotive” was left idle in the sidings. 　　So the ambition of the two leaders’ proposal for a post-covid EU recovery plan, unveiled on May 18th, came as a genuine surprise. The plan, mainly thrashed out in three videoconferences between the pair, comprises four pillars, including boosting the EU’s health-care capabilities and its economic “sovereignty”, a pet theme for Mr Macron. But at its heart is a recovery fund worth €500bn ($546bn), or 3.6% of the EU’s GDP, to be financed by common borrowing and sitting inside the club’s seven-year budget (“multiannual financial framework”, or MFF). Italy and Spain immediately signed on. Markets surged and Italian borrowing costs fell. French media, often hostile to Mr Macron, were cock-a-hoop. 　　Mr Macron would have preferred a larger fund, preferably operating outside the MFF. But by far the bigger compromise is Mrs Merkel’s. As covid-19 ripped through Europe, the chancellor resisted calls to lend Germany’s full weight to collective efforts to support the hardest-hit countries. France led a nine-country push for joint and severally guaranteed “coronabonds”, but Peter Altmaier, Germany’s economy minister and a Merkel confidant, dismissed it as a “phantom debate”. 　　That has not changed. Under the new plan governments’ liabilities would be limited to guarantees equivalent to their contribution to the MFF (Germany’s 27% share would leave it on the hook for €135bn). Yet German support for EU debt incurred on this scale is “an enormous shift in principle”, says Iain Begg, an EU-watcher at the London School of Economics. Mrs Merkel’s second concession is to agree that countries that receive the funds, which will be directed to regions and sectors in acute need, need not repay them. Germany, relatively unscathed by the crisis and less exposed to its economic consequences, such as a collapse in tourism, can therefore expect to stump up a lot more than it receives. 　　The deal appears to have come together only in the few days preceding the announcement, after pressure on Mrs Merkel from both Mr Macron and Olaf Scholz, Germany’s finance minister. Why did she budge? Officials say her first instinct was simply for a larger MFF, until it became clear that cash-strapped governments could not afford it. The chancellor repeatedly described the crisis as the worst the EU has ever known, a hint she was open to more drastic steps. A recent ruling by Germany’s constitutional court questioning the European Central Bank’s bond-buying may also have focused her mind on the risks of over-reliance on monetary policy. 　　Criticism from Mrs Merkel’s conservative allies has been muted. But other challenges lie ahead. The first is to plug the plan’s gaps, among them the rules for allocating funds and repaying the debt. This is the job of the European Commission; its MFF proposal, which may offer loans on top of the envisaged transfers, will be unveiled on May 27th. That in turn will kick off fierce negotiations among the EU’s 27 governments, all of which must approve the new budget. Several have already signalled displeasure. Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden, the self-styled “frugal four”, want a smaller fund, loans rather than grants, and tight conditions. 　　These minnows will surely bow before the combined might of France and Germany, but may extract a price. MFF disbursements are usually light on conditions. But the Franco-German deal commits governments that tap the fund to “sound economic policies and an ambitious reform agenda”. German sources have hinted at a role for the annual economic-reform proposals Brussels sends to governments. But accepting structural reforms demanded by outsiders could prove hard to swallow for countries like Italy. 　　The frugals’ greatest fear is a permanent shift to deeper fiscal integration. The new fund is supposed to be temporary, and can only hope to mitigate the harm to ravaged economies. But establishing the principle that common challenges require common debt may ensure that next time the threshold for action is lower, says Jacob Funk Kirkegaard at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. The need to repay the debt will also spur ideas for common EU revenues, such as a tax on plastic or climate-unfriendly imports. Mrs Merkel’s rhetoric on EU reform has begun a curious shift; in the twilight of her chancellorship she has revived talk of revising its treaties to shift towards “political union”. This week’s may not be her last surprise. 来源：经济学人 \t