安联：全球贸易可能遭受双重打击

安联：全球贸易可能遭受双重打击(2020.06.02) .zhubiaoti {font-family: 黑体;font-size:18pt;line-height:23pt; text-align:center;FONT-weight:800;color:black} .fubiaoti {font-family: 黑体;font-size:14pt;line-height:20pt; text-align:center;FONT-weight:700;color:black} .zhongwen{font-size:12pt;line-height:180%} .yingwen{font-size:13pt;line-height:150%} .tiyao{font-family: 楷体_GB2312;font-size:14pt;line-height:150%} 　　提要：受新冠疫情影响，全球商品贸易额在今年1季度创下2009年1季度以来的最大跌幅，而且2季度可能出现更大幅度的下跌。随着新冠疫情趋稳，全球贸易有望在今年下半年有所复苏。然而，对医疗产品的短期保护主义措施、经济爱国主义论调卷土重来和政策立场的重新调整可能会扰乱供应链，并延缓下半年的贸易复苏。 　　（外脑精华·北京）跌幅巨大 　　今年1季度全球商品贸易额创下2009年1季度以来最高降幅，而这只是全球贸易下滑的开始。我们编制的贸易势头指数显示，全球贸易额在2季度可能将出现更大幅度的下滑。实际上，4月份全球贸易额可能将同比下降13%。 　　1季度全球贸易总额环比下降2.5%，3月份全球贸易总额第3个季度负增长（1月份和2月份分别下降1.4%和4.3%。3月份，随着经济复苏，中国出口额环比增长12.4%（同比增长2.3%），而欧元区3月遭受最严重冲击，由于欧元区最大经济区的经济停滞，欧元区3月份出口额环比下降7.7%（同比下降10%）。鉴于4月份全球50%的GDP在4月份处于封锁状态以及出口订单减少表明中国出口需求增长乏力，我们预计全球贸易将在2季度触底。 　　以美元计价的全球商品的贸易价格在3月份进一步下跌（环比下跌3.6%），使得1季度全球商品的贸易价格环比下跌6.2%。这是油价震荡和大宗商品价格整体下跌所致，当时中国和欧洲的需求停滞，而美元汇率大幅升值。对出口企业而言，价格效应将会加剧需求冲击，进而抑制出口收入。 　　但是，这并非服务贸易的发展态势，鉴于全球旅游和运输服务业崩盘，全球服务贸易额可能将出现更大的两位数跌幅。由于运输和旅行依然受到限制，即使国内封锁政策放宽，服务贸易也将需要更长时间才能恢复至原有水平。因而，我们预计到今年年末，全球商品和服务贸易额不会超过新冠危机前90%的水平。 　　行业态势 　　这对企业意味着什么呢？在今年，我们预计能源行业将受到最严重打击（出口额将下降7330亿美元），其次是金属行业（出口额将下降4200亿美元）和与车企相关的运输服务业（出口额将下降2700亿美元）。虽然机械设备、纺织品和汽车供应商的绝对损失额将较，但其出口额将大幅下跌15%以上。唯一毫发未损的行业将是软件及IT服务业（出口而将增长510亿美元）和制药业（出口额将增长270亿美元）。股市也对我们已经确定将遭受重创的行业做出回应：今年以来，摩根士丹利资本国际指数中能源行业、汽车行业、交通运输业以及金属和采矿业的市值分别累计下跌37%、18%、16%和11%，而摩根士丹利资本国际指数的总市值累计下跌12%。银行也市值也大幅下跌39%。 　　国家态势 　　哪个国家将会成为最大输家呢？同2019年相比，今年几乎没有哪个国家能实现出口增长。出口额降幅最大的无疑是最大出口国：中国（出口额下降2750亿美元）、美国（出口额下降2460亿美元）和德国（出口额下降2390亿美元）。我们基于出口额绝对值的降幅及其在2019年出口总额中的占比对各国进行了排名。出口额绝对值的降幅及其在2019年出口总额中的占比可能更高的是俄罗斯、英国、墨西哥、西班牙、阿联酋、比利时和沙特等国家。 　　政策风险 　　最后一点是，对医疗产品的短期保护主义措施、经济爱国主义论调卷土重来和政策立场的重新调整可能会在复苏阶段扰乱供应链，并延缓下半年的贸易复苏。虽然中国近期对澳大利亚大麦出口征收80%的关税，但随着美国对中国在新冠危机中所扮演的角色的指责愈演愈烈，有关美国将对中国商品征收关税的传闻也甚嚣尘上。短期贸易争端可能会挫伤信心，令市场惶恐不安，并且抑制投资周期。经济史学家已经证明，20世纪30年代的大萧条可能因采取限制性贸易政策而加剧。在最近的2019年，美中贸易纷争及其造成的制造业衰退导致全球贸易额下降3000多亿美元。 　　我们还应密切关注中期政策的调整。美国贸易代表支持终止离岸外包，而欧洲议会则宣布“支持供应链重新融入欧盟”。企业全面回流以及与中国经济脱钩是否具有意义呢？ 　　首先，在过去20年中，全球对中国制造业的总依赖度有所上升，这使得企业回流的难度加大：不仅中国制造业在世界制造业中的占比自2004年以来翻了一番多，而且各国对中国投入品的直接和间接依赖上升。实际上，中国是美国的一个投入品供应商。但中国还是德国、日本、墨西哥和加拿大的主要汽车零部件供应商。这些国家在生产出售给美国汽车企业的汽车零部件时，使用中国的投入品，这使得这些国家对中国的间接依赖度元高于所观察点的水平。 　　第二，重组并不一定意味着降低风险：它也可能意味着把所有的鸡蛋放在同一个篮子里，从而在危机来临时产生顺周期性风险。想象一下，所有行业都会受到国内经济波动的影响。如果一个经济体处于封锁状态，工厂也必须被封锁，那么它就不能真正在当地生产它所需要的一切。 　　其次，企业回流并不一定意味着会降低风险：这也可能意味着将所有鸡蛋放在同一个篮子里，从而在危机降临是会产生顺周期性风险。设想一下，所有行业都变得面临遭受国内经济波动影响的风险。如果一个经济体处于封锁状态，工厂也必须被封锁，工厂就不能真正生产出本地所需的所有产品。 　　第三，日益高涨的民怨和企业回流可能将发生矛盾，因为这将导致高劳动力成本转嫁给消费者。虽然政策制定者极力鼓吹战略独立，但提升汽车或日常电子产品等主要耐用品的售价可能将不得热心，而且具有政治微妙性。 　　最后一点是，除政治论据外，企业回流的动机仍然缺乏，而且可能会耗费巨额公共资金，而且这一巨额成本可能将转嫁给纳税人。企业会付出牺牲利润的代价吗？是否所有的政府都会设法绕过里卡多的比较优势和以及在劳动力更廉价的地区配置劳动力呢？就目前来看，富有雄心的政策立场和商业激励措施之间似乎存在一种偏差。 　　但是将会受到干扰的不仅是贸易，因为更严的外国直接投资筛选可能导致跨境资本流动放缓。经合组织表示，近年来，全球外国直接投资流入中近55%～65%的投资流入实施跨境审查外国直接投资程序的国家，为20世纪90年代大部分时间中可能受到安全审查的全球外国直接投资流入额的两倍。新冠危机可能将推进这一趋势，欧盟和英国明显可能会强化其筛选规则。联合国贸发会议预测，2020～2021年期间，全球外国直接投资额将大幅下降（下降40%）至20年来的最低水平。 　　英文原文： Recession confirmed, watch out for a double whammy blow due to protectionism 　　Q1’s strongest contraction in merchandise trade since Q1 2009 is only the first part of the story. Our proprietary Trade Momentum Index shows that Q2 is likely to see an even stronger contraction. Indeed, April could post a -13% y/y drop. 　　Overall trade contracted -2.5% q/q in Q1 as March posted a third straight negative figure (-1.4% m/m and -4.3% y/y). In March, China’s exports rebounded by +12.4% m/m (+2.3% y/y) as the economy restarted, while the Euro area suffered the largest blow, -7.7% m/m (-10% y/y), as its largest economies were on pause. We expect the trough to be reached in Q2, with half of global GDP under lockdown in April and Chinese exports stuttering in search of missing demand, as shown by even weaker export orders. 　　World merchandise trade prices in USD contracted even more in March (-3.6% m/m), bringing the Q1 figure to -6.2%. This is the result of the oil price shock and the overall commodity price drop as China and then Europe’s demand came to a halt while the dollar significantly appreciated. For exporters, the price effect should aggravate the demand shock, weighing on export revenues. 　　Yet this picture overlooks trade in services, which likely saw an even stronger double-digit drop in Q1, due to plummeting travel and transport services around in the world. Trade in services should take longer to recover as transport and travel restrictions remain in place even while domestic lockdowns ease. For this reason, we do not expect global trade of goods and services to exceed 90% of its pre-crisis level by the end of this year. 　　What does this mean for companies? In 2020, we expect the energy sector to be hit the hardest (-USD733bn export losses), followed by metals (-USD420bn) and transport services tied with automotive manufacturers (-USD270bn). While machinery and equipment, textiles and automobile suppliers will lose less in absolute value, the value of their exports will plummet by more than 15%. The only unscathed sectors should be software and IT services (+USD51bn export gain) and pharmaceuticals (+USD27bn). The stock market is also pricing in significant damage to the sectors we have identified: year to date, MSCI Energy lost -37% of its value, the auto sector -18%, transportation -16% and metals and mining -11%, while the aggregate MSCI world index lost -12%. Banking sector equities also lost a staggering -39%. 　　Which country will lose the most? This year barely any country will register export gains compared to 2019. The hardest hit in total value of export losses are, without surprise, the largest exporters: China (-USD275bn), the U.S. (-USD246bn) and Germany (-USD239bn). We rank countries by export losses in absolute value and their share of 2019 total exports. Those who could register high export losses in absolute value and as a share of their total exports are the following: Russia, the UK, Mexico, Spain, the UAE, Belgium and Saudi Arabia. 　　Lastly, short-term protectionist measures on medical goods, the resurgence of economic patriotism rhetoric and reshoring policy stances could disrupt supply chains in the recovery phase and slow the resumption of activity in H2. While China recently slapped Australian barley exports with an 80% tariff, rumors about tariffs on the U.S.’s imports from China are mounting as accusations against Beijing’s role in the Covid-19 crisis intensify. Short-term trade spats could derail confidence, spook markets and halt the investment cycle. Economic historians have demonstrated that the 1930s Great Depression was likely aggravated by the adoption of restrictive trade policies. As recently as in 2019, the U.S.-China trade feud and the manufacturing recession it created subtracted more than USD300bn from global trade. 　　Medium-term policy shifts also ought to be monitored. The U.S. trade representative hailed the end of offshoring, while the European parliament declared it “supports the reintegration of supply chains inside the EU”. Could a generalized move towards reshoring and decoupling from the Chinese economy make sense? 　　First, the total reliance on Chinese manufacturing has grown in the past 20 years, rendering reshoring all the more difficult: Not only did Chinese manufacturing as a share of world manufacturing more than double since 2004, but countries have increased their direct and indirect reliance on Chinese inputs (Baldwin and Evenett, 2020). Indeed, China is a supplier of inputs for the U.S.. But it is also a major supplier of auto parts to Germany, Japan, Mexico and Canada. These countries in turn use Chinese inputs when making auto parts and components they sell to U.S.-based automakers, which creates an indirect reliance on China, much larger than the observed reliance. 　　Second, reshoring does not necessarily mean de-risking: it can also mean putting all your eggs in the same basket, thus creating a risk of pro-cyclicality when the crisis hits. Imagine all sectors become exposed to domestic fluctuations in the economy. If an economy is in lockdown and its factories have to be locked, it cannot really produce everything it needs locally. 　　Third, growing social discontent could be incompatible with reshoring as it would entail high labor costs passed down to the consumer. While strategic independence is touted by policymakers, raising the price for key durables such as automobiles or everyday electronic items could be unpopular and politically delicate. 　　Lastly, beyond political arguments, incentives for businesses to reshore are still lacking, and they could cost a lot of public money, possibly passed down to taxpayers. Will companies take it on their margins? Will all governments manage to bypass Ricardo’s comparative advantage and allocation of labor where it’s cheaper? As of today there seems to be a discrepancy between ambitious policy stances and business incentives. 　　But it’s not only trade that could be disrupted, as more diligent foreign direct investment screening could slow cross-border capital flows. According to the OECD, in most recent years, around 55% to 65% of global Foreign Direct Investment inflows went into countries that apply cross-sectoral review FDI processes – twice the share of global FDI inflows that were potentially subject to security-motivated screening for most of the 1990s. The Covid-19 crisis is likely to accelerate this trend, with the EU and the UK notably potentially toughening their screening rules. UNCTAD predicts a drastic drop in global FDI flows – up to 40% – during 2020-2021, reaching the lowest level in two decades. 来源：安联，作者：Georges Dib \t