安联：法德联手推进欧盟财政一体化

安联：法德联手推进欧盟财政一体化(2020.05.28) .zhubiaoti {font-family: 黑体;font-size:18pt;line-height:23pt; text-align:center;FONT-weight:800;color:black} .fubiaoti {font-family: 黑体;font-size:14pt;line-height:20pt; text-align:center;FONT-weight:700;color:black} .zhongwen{font-size:12pt;line-height:180%} .yingwen{font-size:13pt;line-height:150%} .tiyao{font-family: 楷体_GB2312;font-size:14pt;line-height:150%} 　　提要：5月18日，德国总理默克尔和法国总统马克龙发表联合声明，提议设立一家规模5000亿欧元的复苏基金，以帮助遭受新冠疫情最严重冲击的欧盟成员国。联合声明中还提及拟定的几项宏伟的欧盟发展计划。该声明凸显出德法联手推进欧洲财政一体化的雄心，这可能会为进一步构建真正的欧洲财政联盟奠定基础。 　　（外脑精华·北京）复苏基金 　　5月18日，德国总理默克尔和法国总统马克龙联合提议设立一家规模5000亿欧元（相当于2019年欧盟GDP的3.6%）的暂时性复苏基金，以帮助遭受新冠疫情最严重冲击的欧盟经济体。 　　该计划提议在基于欧盟预算框架的一项具有约束力的偿还计划支持下，授权欧委会在资本市场发行债券。虽然各成员国对复苏基金的出资额将于各成员国的经济权重挂钩，但该基金向各地区和各行业提供的财政支持（主要是以拨款而非贷款形式）将基于需求，即新冠危机造成的负面影响。 　　意大利表示，在创建转移支付联盟方面的这一首项举措或许看似收益甚微，但意义重大。基于以2019年名义GDP为所获救助资金的一个参数和以各成员国在欧盟27个成员国中的权重为出资的一个参数的测算结果显示，在一个为期数年的时期（最有可能为3年，以期提前获得财政支持），意大利将获得欧盟救助资金总额中20%的救助资金，这将只相当于意大利GDP约2%的净支付额。根据其经济权重，意大利的出资额在复苏基金资本总额中的占比约为13%，因而，在不考虑节省偿债成本这一同样至关重要的因素的情况下，意大利必须至少收回这笔款项才能实现收支平衡。此外，这笔救助资金的规模将不够充足：在意大利，与新冠危机相关的预期经济衰退可能导致2020年意大利GDP下降11.4%，意大利公债/GDP指标上升至169%。欧盟复苏基金的象征意义仍大于其实际经济影响。有趣的是，一次计算中，希腊、波兰、奥地利和德国将依次成为主要净贡献国。具有讽刺意味的是，鉴于新冠疫情对英国经济的严重影响，如果英国并未脱欧，可能最终成为欧盟复苏基金的净接受者。 　　不过，德法两国的联合提议承载着历史责任，应被视为发行欧元债券方面额一项尝试举措，德国对此的信心倍增。如果受援国利用这些资金来提升其经济增长潜力，这可能会为进一步构建一个真正的财政联盟奠定基础，因为预计欧盟成员国将遵循稳健的经济政策和富有雄心的改革议程。在这种情况下，该提议提及的最低有效税率以及对数字经济公平征税（后者可能在未来推动欧盟财政收入增长）突显出德法联手推进欧洲财政一体化的雄心。 　　债务机构 　　复苏基金的创建还可能孕育一家欧洲债务机构。几乎无人意识到，欧委会实际上已经发行了数年的联合债券（显然没有达到复苏基金的规模）。鉴于规模达到5000亿欧元，欧盟复苏基金将成为欧元（准）政府部门中的第5大债券发行机构，其规模略大于欧洲投资银行。 　　这将足以构成一个欧元区流动性基准曲线。例如，截至目前，欧盟稳定机制尚未真正做到这一点。这条曲线也可以作为欧元债券市场的另一条参考曲线。假设复苏基金被赋予欧委会现行的AAA信用评级，我们预计欧盟复苏基金的再融资能力将略高于德国，接近欧洲投资银行和复兴信贷银行的水平（信用评级均为AAA级）。 　　复苏基金将倾向于发行超长期债券，而不是永久债券。关于复苏基金是否应应该发行一些永久债券问题，我们认为这将是一种风险策略。首先，永久债券可能无法达到欧洲央行的资格标准。此外，投资者面临的风险导致永久债券的需求通常有限，因为只有在二级市场上出售或赎回债券时才能收回投资。欧元区目前不存在永久主权债券。无法确定永久债券是否将会受到市场青睐。市场接受度将是一个重大不确定性因素。发行失败对欧盟和欧元区金融稳定将是一个灾难性信号，并可能摧毁与创建复苏基金相关的乐观情绪。如果确实打算发行超长期限债券（无论是基于代际平等还是其他原因，即便欧洲央行只能购买期限最长为30年的债券），应该致力于发行50～100年期的债券。过去发行的超长债券（利润奥地利发行的70年期和100年期还请）已经受到试图配置长期债券资产或希望将其用作久期风险方面的高风险非衍生投机性工具的投资者的青睐。目前，市场上流通的期限超过50年的欧洲超长期债券的规模仅为130亿欧元。这一细分市场肯定具有更高的吸收能力。 　　融资结构将为欧盟复苏基金的未来指明发展方向。如果大规模发行超长期债券，欧盟复苏基金可能仍处于萌芽状态，并且成为已经高度分散的欧洲（准）国债市场的另一个参与者。如果选择更具灵活性和多远化的融资方式，复苏基金可能成为有能力促进来市场协调的一个活跃的市场参与者。 　　宏伟计划 　　法德提案的内容绝不仅是提议成立复苏基金。实际上，在联合发布的声明中，法德两国已为欧盟制定了几项宏伟计划。法德两国立场的一致正在稳定市场信心（尤其是在市场压力减弱之际）。预计这些所提想法将在德国就任欧盟主席国期间及以后的任期内占据重要地位。除寻求在卫生政策领域提升竞争力之外，该提案寻求在执行宏伟工业战略、确保市场开发和自由（公平）贸易方面的领导地位以及应对气候变化之间达成一种良好平衡，并推动社会公平性在欧洲从新冠危机中复苏的过程中发挥更重大作用。按行业划分的“绿色复苏路线图”、提高减排目标以及欧盟排放交易机制中的措施和最低碳定价是更宽泛的宏伟目标之一，以印证欧洲对绿色复苏的承诺。在加快数字化转型方面，该提案的内容包括推出5G和加强网络安全，为人工智能建立一个良好框架，以及对数字平台进行公平监管。在提升欧盟经济和工业韧性、主权性以及强化单一市场方面，该提案提出的优先事项是：支持供应链多远化、建立反补贴机制，确保公共采购与第三方国家的有效互惠、创建一种强有力的非欧盟投资筛选机制、鼓励在欧盟地区（重新）选址投资、实现竞争政策的现代化、完成欧盟数字、能源和资本市场的创建、深化社会融合以及加快讨论适应国情的欧盟最低工资框架。 　　不利因素 　　德法的计划需要得到欧盟理事会的支持。在法德提出联合提案后，剩余25个欧盟成员国目前正在就此提议进行讨论。随着时间的推移，确保这些基金能为整个欧洲的复苏提供足够的便利是决定能否迅速达成协议的一个至关重要的因素。虽然意大利和西班牙已经表示支持建立复苏基金，但奥地利、荷兰、丹麦和瑞典对这此提议反应冷淡，坚称任何财政支持都需以贷款形式提供。与此同时，基于担心欧盟预算负担加重可能会导致与新冠疫情无关的结构性基金的救助资金规模减少，欧盟中的东欧成员国也可能会保持谨慎立场。因而，在我们得意忘形之前，存在的一个巨大风险是需要淡化该提案来确保质疑该提案的欧盟成员国认可这一提案。例如，分发密钥可能会受到严格审查，以确保净支付不会过度集中于少数国家，而是更广泛地共享。欧委会的最终提案预计将于5月27日提交，在全体一致投票后，还将需获得各国政府批准。 　　英文原文： A German-French trial balloon on fiscal union 　　On 18 May German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron proposed the set-up of a one-off EUR500bn strong (3.6% of 2019 EU GDP) recovery fund to help those economies hit hardest by the Covid-19 pandemic. 　　The plan would see the European Commission issue bonds on capital markets, backed by a binding repayment plan on the EU budget. Whereas national contributions to the fund would be guided by a member state’s economic weight, financial support paid out by the fund to regions and sectors – crucially in the form of grants and not loans – would be determined by need i.e. the negative impact from the Covid-19 crisis. 　　This first attempt at a transfer union may make net payouts look small for, say Italy, but symbols do matter. With a quick calculation using 2019 nominal GDP as a pay-in and each country’s share in total EU27 Covid-19 cases as a pay-out key, we see that Italy would receive 20% of the EU rescue fund, which then however would only amount to a net payment of around 2% of Italian national GDP spread out over a multi-year period (most likely three years in an effort to front-load the financial support. Italy’s contribution registers close to 13% of the total rescue fund based on its economic weight, hence it would have to receive at least that amount back to break even – disregarding any savings on debt service costs which are of course also significant. In addition, these amounts will not suffice: In Italy, the expected economic setback related to the Covid-19 crisis will probably see GDP drop by 11.4% in 2020 and public debt rise to 169% of GDP. The symbolism of the EU rescue fund still outweighs its actual economic impact. Interestingly, in this calculation, Greece, Poland, Austria and Germany – in that order – would emerge as key net contributors. Ironically, given the harsh impact of Covid-19 on its economy, the UK would probably have ended up being a net receiver from the EU rescue fund if not for Brexit. 　　Yet, the German-French proposal carries historic weight and should be understood as a Eurobond trial balloon, with Germany taking a relatively huge leap of faith. If recipient countries are using the funds to upgrade their economies’ growth potential, it could open the door to further steps towards a real fiscal union, as member states are expected to follow sound economic policies and an ambitious reform agenda. In this context, the proposal’s reference to a minimum effective tax rate as well as a fair taxation of the digital economy (the latter perhaps to raise EU fiscal revenue in the future) underlines the ambition of the German-French tandem to move ahead with fiscal integration. 　　The creation of the fund could also give birth to a European debt agency in embryonic form. There has been little awareness that the EU Commission has in fact issued joint debt already for several years – clearly not at this scale. With a volume of outstanding debt to the tune of €500bn, the EU rescue fund would become the fifth largest issuer within the Euro (quasi-) government segment, slightly larger than the EIB. 　　This would be sufficient to form a liquid Eurozone benchmark curve. Something the ESM, for example, did not really manage to do so far. This curve may then also serve as an alternative reference curve for the euro bond market. Supposing the rescue fund is assigned the EU Commission’s current AAA rating, we would expect the EU rescue fund to refinance itself slightly above Germany, close to the EIB and KFW (both AAA). 　　Prefer ultra-long bond financing over perpetual bonds (or consols). When it comes to question whether the fund should be partly financed with perpetual bonds, we think this would be a risky strategy. For one, perpetual bonds may not meet the ECB’s eligibility criteria. Moreover demand for perpetual bonds is usually limited as the risk balance for the investor is skewed to his disadvantage, as the investment can only be retrieved if the bond is sold in the secondary market or gets called. Perpetual sovereign bonds do not currently exist in the Eurozone. It is not sure they would fly. The market acceptance would be a major uncertainty. A failed issuance would be a disastrous signal for the EU and Eurozone financial stability, and could destroy much of the positive sentiment related to the creation of the fund. If one really wants to use ultra-long maturities (be it for intergenerational equality or other reasons – even though the ECB can only buy debt with maturities up to 30 years), one should rather aim for emissions in the 50-100 years segment. Past issuances of ultra-long bonds (e.g. Austria 70y and 100y) have shown strong interest by investors that either try to match long-term liabilities or want to use them as high beta non-derivative speculative instruments on duration risk. Currently there are only EUR13bn worth of bonds outstanding with maturities of +50 years. This market segment surely has more absorption capacity. 　　The funding structure will set the course for the future of the EU rescue fund. If it is massively financed with ultra-long bonds, it is likely to remain stuck in its embryonic form and become just another player in the already highly fragmented European (quasi-)government bond market. If a more flexible and diversified funding approach is chosen, it could become an active market player with the capacity to contribute to a market harmonization. 　　Yesterday’s announcement is about much more than the proposed rescue fund. In fact, in its statement, the German-French couple lays out a few moonshots for the European Union. This alignment – particularly at times of subdued market stress – is reassuring. Expect the proposed ideas to feature heavily in Germany’s upcoming EU presidency and beyond. Next to seeking more competences in the area of health policy, the proposal strikes a fine balance between pursuing an ambitious industrial strategy and remaining a champion of open markets and free (but fair) trade, with the fight against climate change, and for more social fairness playing key roles in driving the recovery from the Covid-19 crisis. “Green recovery roadmaps” by sector, higher emission reduction targets coupled with measures and a minimum carbon pricing in the EU ETS are part of the broader ambition, confirming Europe‘s commitment to greening the recovery. With regard to speeding up the digital transformation, the proposal includes the rollout of 5G and a strengthening of cybersecurity, as well as the set-up of an enabling framework for AI, plus fair regulation for digital platforms. On the ambitions to enhance EU economic and industrial resilience and sovereignty and strengthening the single market, the priorities are: supporting the diversification of supply chains, developing an anti-subventions mechanism, ensuring effective reciprocity of public procurement with third countries, setting up a strong non-EU investment screening, encouraging investment (re)location in the EU, a modernization of competition policy, the completion of the EU digital, energy and capital markets, reinforcing social convergence and speeding up the discussion on an EU framework for minimum wages – adapted to national situations. 　　Domestic and international headwinds: Watch the EU council for answers. Following the presentation of the Merkel-Macron proposal, the ball is now in the court of the remaining 25 EU members. With time of the essence to ensure that the funds are able to provide the recovery across Europe with sufficient tailwind, a swift agreement is essential. While Italy and Spain have already voiced their support for the rescue fund, Austria together with the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden gave the idea a lukewarm response - to put it mildly - insisting that any financial support needs to come in the form of loans. Meanwhile the Eastern European EU members are also likely to remain cautious out of fear that the additional burden put on the EU budget could reduce available non-Covid-19 related structural funds. Hence, before we get carried away, there is a sizeable risk that the proposal will need to be watered down to make it palatable for the more skeptical member states. For instance, the distribution key could come under much scrutiny to ensure that net payments are not too focused on a small number of countries but instead more widely shared. The EU Commission’s final proposal is expected on 27 May, which, following an unanimous vote, will also need to be ratified by national governments. 来源：安联，作者：Ludovic Subran \t